The Buddhist term Anatman (Sanskrit), or Anatta (Pali) is an adjective
in sutra used to refer to the nature of phenomena as being devoid of
the Soul, that being the ontological and subjective Self (atman) which
is the "light (dipam), and only refuge" [DN 2.100]. Of the 662
occurrences of the term Anatta in the Nikayas, its usage is restricted
to referring to 22 nouns (forms, feelings, perception, experiences,
consciousness, the eye, eye-consciousness, desires, mentation, mental
formations, ear, nose, tongue, body, lusts, things unreal, etc.), all
phenomenal, as being Selfless (anatta). Contrary to countless many
popular (=3Dprofane, or =3D consensus, from which the truth can 'never be
gathered') books (as Buddhologist C.A.F. Davids has deemed them
'miserable little books') written outside the scope of Buddhist
doctrine, there is no "Doctrine of anatta/anatman" mentioned anywhere
in the sutras, rather anatta is used only to refer to impermanent
things/phenomena as other than the Soul, to be anatta, or Self-less
(an-atta).
Specifically in sutra, anatta is used to describe the tem****al
and unreal (metaphysically so) nature of any and all composite,
consubstantial, phenomenal, and tem****al things, from the macrocosmic,
to microcosmic, be it matter as pertains the physical body, the cosmos
at large, including any and all mental machinations which are of the
nature of arising and passing. Anatta in sutra is synonymous and
interchangeable with the terms dukkha (suffering) and anicca
(impermanent); all three terms are often used in triplet in making a
blanket statement as regards any and all phenomena. Such as: "All
these aggregates are anicca, dukkha, and anatta."
Anatta refers only to the absence of the permanent soul as
pertains any or all of the psycho-physical (namo-rupa) attributes, or
khandhas (skandhas, aggregates). Anatta/Anatman in the earliest
existing Buddhist texts, the Nikayas, is an adjective, (A is anatta, B
is anatta, C is anatta). The commonly held belief to wit that: "Anatta
means no-soul, therefore Buddhism taught that there was no soul" is a
concept, which cannot be found or doctrinally substantiated by means
of the Nikayas, the suttas (Skt. Sutras), of Buddhism.
The Pali compound term and noun for "no soul" is natthatta
(literally "there is not/no[nattha]+atta'[Soul]), not the term anatta,
and is mentioned at Samyutta Nikaya 4.400, where Gotama was asked if
there "was no soul (natthatta)", equated this question to be
equivalent to Nihilism (ucchedavada). Common throughout Buddhist sutra
is the denial of psycho-physical attributes of the mere empirical self
to be the Soul, or confused with same. The Buddhist paradigm as
regards phenomena is "Na me so atta" (this/these are not my soul),
nearly so the most common utterance of Gotama the Buddha in the
Nikayas, where "na me so atta" =3D Anatta/Anatman. In sutta, to hold the
view that there was "no-Soul" (natthatta) is =3D to ucchedavada (SN
4.400) [Annihilationism] =3D natthika (nihilist). Buddhism differs from
the "nothing-morist" (Skt. Nastika, Pali natthika) in affirming a
spiritual nature that is not in any wise, but immeasurable,
inconnumerable, infinite, and inaccessible to observation; and of
which, therefore, empirical science can neither affirm nor deny the
reality thereof of him who has 'Gone to That[Brahman]" (tathatta). It
is to the Spirit (Skt. Atman, Pali attan) as distinguished from
oneself (namo-rupa/ or khandhas, mere self as =3D anatta)-i.e., whatever
is phenomenal and formal (Skt. and Pali nama-rupa, and savinnana-kaya)
"name and appearance", and the "body with its consciousness". [SN
2.17] 'Nonbeing (asat, natthiti [views of either sabbamnatthi 'the all
is ultimately not' (atomism), and sabbam puthuttan 'the all is merely
composite' [SN 2.77] both are heresies of annihilationism])'". In
contrast it has been incorrectly asserted that affirm the atman is =3D
sassatavada (conventionally deemed 'eternalism'). However the Pali
term sasastavada is never associated with the atman, but that the
atman was an agent (karmin) in and of samsara which is subject to the
whims of becoming (bhava), or which is meant kammavada (karma-ism, or
merit agency****p); such as sassatavada in sutta =3D "atta ca so loka
ca" (the atman and the world [are one]), or: 'Being (sat, atthiti
[views of either sabbamatthi 'the all is entirety', and sabbamekattan
'the all is one's Soul' [SN 2.77] both are heresies of perpetualism]).
Sasastavada is the wrong conception that one is perpetually (sassata)
bound within samsara and that merit is the highest attainment for
either this life or for the next. The heretical antinomy to nihilism
(vibhava, or =3D ucchedavada) is not, nor in sutta, the atman, but bhava
(becoming, agency****p). Forever, or eternal becoming is nowhere in
sutta identified with the atman, which is "never an agent (karmin)",
and "has not become anything" (=3Dbhava). These antinomies of bhava
(sassatavada) and vibhava (ucchedavada) both entail illogical
positions untenable to the Vedantic or Buddhist atman; however the
concept of "eternalism" as =3D atman has been the fallacious secondary
crutch for sup****ting the no-atman commentarialists position on anatta
implying =3D there is no atman.
Logically so, according to the philosophical premise of Gotama,
the initiate to Buddhism who is to be "shown the way to Immortality
(amata)" [MN 2.265, SN 5.9], wherein liberation of the spirit/mind
[Greek =3D nous] (cittavimutta) is effectuated thru the expansion of
wisdom and the meditative practices of sati and samadhi (assimilation,
or synthesis, complete disobjectification with all objective [unreal]
reality), must first be educated away from his former ignorance-based
(avijja) materialistic proclivities in that he "saw any of these
forms, feelings, this body in whole or part, to be my Self, to be that
which I am by nature". Teaching the via negativa methodology of anatta
in sutta pertains solely to things phenomenal, which were: "subject to
perpetual change; therefore unfit to declare of such things 'these are
mine, these are what I am, that these are my Soul'" [MN 1.232]. The
one scriptural passage where Gotama is asked by a layperson what the
meaning of anatta is as follows: [Samyutta Nikaya 3.196] At one time
in Savatthi, the venerable Radha seated himself and asked of the
Blessed Lord Buddha: "Anatta, anatta I hear said venerable. What pray
tell does Anatta mean?" "Just this Radha, form is not the Soul
(anatta), sensations are not the Soul (anatta), perceptions are not
the Soul (anatta), assemblages are not the Soul (anatta),
consciousness is not the Soul (anatta). Seeing thusly, this is the end
of birth, the Brahman life has been fulfilled, what must be done has
been done."
Anatta as taught in the Nikayas has merely relative value as is
directly conducive to Subjective awakening, or illumination; it is not
an absolute one. It does not say or imply simply that the Soul (atta,
Atman) has no reality, but that certain things (5 aggregates), with
which the unlearned man (fool =3D puthujjana, as is always implied in
spiritual texts, a materialist) identifies himself, are not the Soul
(anatta) and that is why one should grow disgusted with them, become
detached from them and be liberated. This principle of anatta does not
negate the Soul as such, but denies Selfhood to those things that
constitute the non-self (anatta), showing them thereby to be empty of
any ultimate value and to be repudiated; instead of nullifying the
Atman (Soul) doctrine, it in fact compliments and affirms it in the
most logical method by which Subjective gnosis is initially gained,
that by and thru objective negation. It has been said that: 'No Indian
school of thought has ever regarded the human soul or the carrier of
human personal identity as a permanent substance', which is certainly
true when referring to the empirical persona (mere self, as opposed to
the Person, spirit, atman), that 'ensouled' being, as was common in
old English "late at night, not a soul (mere person) was to be seen".
That the atman is not to be understood as a cartesian thinking
substance, phenomena, or eternal soul, is certainly the case.
It cannot be missed that in so discussing the commentarialist's
position of a 'doctrine of anatta' that anatta is merely a qualifier
of something else and that anatta in and of itself in standalone is
utterly meaningless and untenable to speak or make mention of an
'anatta doctrine' without qualification of what, and in what context,
anatta is being qualified of X (the afore mentioned 22 things of which
anatta is said to equal) i.e. that which is defacto equivalent to or
with anatta. That anatta in doctrine is aught but ever equivalent to
what is evil, foul, disgusting, phenomenal and repulsive, to therefore
make declaration that, as many have done, "anatta is a core tenant of
Buddhism" cannot be enjoined, since the principle upon which Buddhism
was founded is the quest for the immortal (amatagamimagga SN 5.9), and
the unceasing bliss as gained by and thru liberation in wisdom's
culmination. Anatta is, obviously so, a key principle in the doctrine
of Buddhism (and other via negativa systems) and the metaphysics
thereof quantify anatta and being meant all physical and mental
consubstantial and tem****al objectivity; all compounded things either
in simplex or complex (mental). As an-atta is meant not-Subject, or
object (phenomena), those things, as Buddhism declares "the unlearned
fool bemuses himself as being (those things)"; "What do you suppose,
followers, if people were carrying off into the Jeta grove bunches of
sticks, gr*****, branches, and leaves and did with them as they wished
or burned them up, would it occur to you: These people are carrying us
off, are doing as they please with us, and are burning us? No, indeed
not Lord. And how so? Because Lord, none of that is our Soul, nor what
our Soul subsists upon! Just so followers, what is not who you are,
do away with it, when you have made done with that, it will lead to
your bliss and welfare for as long as time lasts. What is that you are
not? Form, followers, is not who you are, neither are sensations,
perceptions, experiences, consciousness" [MN 1.141]. Just as
'disgusting (anatta) doctrine' cannot make logical sense, neither does
'anatta doctrine' bring light to studiers of Buddhism what anatta is
contextually or its philosophical im****tance as being merely a
qualifier of that which is evil, foul, disgusting, phenomenal and
repulsive (=3D anatta).
What has Buddhism to say of the Self? "That's not my Self" (na me
so atta); this, and the term "non Self-ishness" (anatta) predicated of
the world and all "things" (sabbe dhamma anatta; Identical with the
Brahmanical "of those who are mortal, there is no Self/Soul", (anatma
hi martyah, [SB., II. 2. 2. 3]). [KN J-1441] "The Soul is the refuge
that I have gone unto". For anatta is not said of the Self/Soul but
what it is not. There is never a 'doctrine of no-Soul', but a doctrine
of what the Soul is not (form is anatta, feelings are anatta, etc.).
It is of course true that the Buddha denied the existence of the mere
empirical "self" in the very meaning of "my-self" (this person so-and-
so, namo-rupa, an-atta, i.e. Bob, Sue, Larry etc.), one might say in
accordance with the command 'denegat seipsum, [Mark VII.34]; but this
is not what modern and highly unenlightened writers mean to say, or
are understood by their readers to say; what they mean to say and do
in fact say, is that the Buddha denied the immortal (amata), the
unborn (ajata), Supreme-Self (mahatta'), uncaused (samskrta), undying
(amara) and eternal (nicca) of the Upanishads. And that is palpably
false, for he frequently speaks of this Self, or Spirit (mahapurisha),
and nowhere more clearly than in the too often repeated formula 'na me
so atta', "This/these are not my Soul" (na me so atta'=3D anatta/
anatman), excluding body (rupa) and the components of empirical
consciousness (vinnana/ nama), a statement to which the words of
Sankhara are peculiarly apposite, "Whenever we deny something unreal,
is it in reference to something real" [Br. Sutra III.2.22]; since it
was not for the Buddha, but for the nihilist (natthika), to deny the
Soul. For, [SN 3.82] "yad anatta....na me so atta, "what is not-Atman...
that is not my Atman"; the extremely descriptive illumination of all
thing which are Selfless (anattati) would be both meaningless and a
waste of much time for Gotama were (as the foolish commentators
espousing Buddhism's denial of the atman) to clarify and simplify his
sermons by outright declaring 'followers, there is no atman!', however
no such passage exists. The Pali for said passage would be:
'bhikkhave, natthattati!'; and most certainly such a passage would
prove the holy grail and boon for the Theravadin nihilists who have
'protesteth too much' that Buddhism is one in which the atman is
rejected, but to no avail or help to their untenable views and
position by the teachings themselves.
Outside of going into the doctrines of later schisms of Buddhism,
such as Sarvastivada, Theravada, Vajrayana, Madhyamika, and lastly
Zen, the oldest existing texts (Nikayas) of Buddhism which predate all
these later schools of Buddhism [The Sanchi and Bharut inscriptions
(aka the Pillar edicts) unquestionably dated to the middle of the
second century B.C.E. push the composition of the 5 Nikayas back to a
earlier date by mentioning the word "pa=F1canekayika" (Five Nikyas),
thereby placing the Nikayas as put together (no later than) at a
period about half way between the death of the Buddha and the
accession of Asoka (before 265 B.C.), as such the 5 Nikayas, the
earliest existing texts of Buddhism, must have been well known and
well established far earlier than generally
perceived. Finally proving the majority of the five Nikayas could not
have been composed any later than the very earliest ****tion of the
third century B.C.E.], anatta is never used pejoratively in any sense
in the Nikayas by Gotama the Buddha, who himself has said: [MN 1.140]
"Both formerly and now, I've never been a nihilist (vinayika), never
been one who teaches the annihilation of a being, rather taught only
the source of suffering (that being avijja, or nescience/agnosis), and
its ending (avijja)." Further investigation into negative theology is
the source by which one should be directed as to a further
understanding of the methodology which the term anatta illuminates. It
should be noted with great im****tance that the founder of Advaita
Vedanta, Samkara used the term anatman lavishly in the exact same
manner as does Buddhism, however in all of time since his passing,
none have accused Samkara of espousing a denial of the Atman. Such as:
"Atma-anatma vivekah kartavyo bandha nuktaye"-"The wiseman should
discriminate between the Atman and the non-Atman (anatman) in order to
be liberated." [Vivekacudamani of Samkara v. 152], "Anatman cintanam
tyaktva kasmalam duhkah karanam, vintayatmanam ananda rupam yan-mukti
karanam."-"Give up all that is non-Atman (anatman), which is the cause
of all misery, think only of the Atman, which is blissful and the
cause of all liberation." [Vivekacudamani of Samkara v. 379], "Every
qualifying characteristic is, as the non-Atman (anatman), comparable
to the empty hand." [Upadisa Sahasri of Samkara v. 6.2], "the
intellect, its modifications, and objects are the non-Atman
(anatman)." [Upadisa Sahasri of Samkara v. 14.9], "The gain of the non-
Atman (anatman) is no gain at all. Therefore one should give up the
notion that one is the non-Atman (anatman)." [Upadisa Sahasri of
Samkara v. 14.44]. In none of the Buddhist suttas is there sup****t for
no-atman theories of anatta . The message is simply to cease regarding
the very khandhas in those terms by which the notion of atman has,
itself, been so easily misconstrued. As has been shown, detaching
oneself from the phenomenal desire for the psycho-physical existence
was also a central part of Samkara's strategy. There is hence nothing
in thee suttas that Samkara, the chief proponent of Advaita Vedanta,
would have disagreed with.
Due to sectarian (and secular) propagation of commentary over
doctrine, and more still a nominalized, or neutered mistranslation of
the original Pali texts, a general acceptance of the concept of "A
Doctrine of Anatta" exists as a status quo, however there exists no
substantiation for same in sutta for Buddhism's denial of the atman,
or in using the term anatta in anything but a positive sense in
denying Self-Nature, the Soul, to any one of a conglomeration of
cor****eal and empirical phenomena which were by their very transitory
nature, "impermanent (anicca), suffering (dukkha), and Selfless
(anatta)". The only noun in sutra which is referred to as "permanent
(nicca)" is the Soul, such as Samyutta Nikaya 1.169. Buddhism's 'na me
so atta' is no more a denial of the Atman than is Socrates' 'to...
soma....ouk estin ho anthropos' (the body is not the Man [Aniochus 365])
is a denial of the Man. Young men asked Gotama as to the whereabouts
of a woman they were seeking to which he replied "What young men do
you think, were it not better for you to seek the Atman (atmanam
gavis) than a woman?" [Vin 1.23]. In fact the term "Anatmavada" is a
concept utterly foreign to Buddhist sutta, existing in only non-
doctrinal Theravada, some Mahayana, and Madhyamika commentaries. As
the truism holds, a "lie repeated often enough over time becomes the
truth". Those interested parties incident to learning of Buddhism are
most often incapable of pouring through endless piles of Buddhist
doctrine, and have therefore defacto accepted the commentarial-based
notion of a "doctrine of anatta" as key to Buddhism itself, when in
fact there exists not one citation of this untenable and irrational
concept in either the Digha, Majjhima, Samyutta, Anguttara, or
Khuddaka Nikayas. Unless evoking a fallacy, we who seek out Buddhism
sans the commentarialists slants and opinion-based musings, must stick
strictly to sutta as reference, wherein the usage of anatta never
falls outside of the parameter of merely denying Self or Soul to the
profane and transitory phenomena of tem****al and samsaric life which
is "subject to arising and passing", and which is most certain not
(an) our Soul (atta). Certainly the most simple philosophical based
logic would lead anyone to conclude that no part of this frail body is
"my Self, is That which I am", is "not my Soul", of which Gotama the
Buddha was wholeheartedly in agreement that no part of it was the Soul
i.e. was in fact anatta. The spiritual and metaphysical adept is one
who must be the "dead man walking" who has followed the commandment:
"die before ye die!", and is one who has died to that (mere) self and
lives in the Spirit, or the Self. This is the discernment between the
Great Self (mahatta) and little self (alpatman); or the fair Self
(kalyanatta) from the foul self (papatta).
The perfect contextual usage of anatta in sutta: "Whatever form,
feelings, perceptions, experiences, or consciousness there are (the
five aggregates), these he sees to be without permanence, as
suffering, as ill, as a plague, a boil, a sting, a pain, an
affliction, as foreign, as otherness, as empty (su=F1=F1ato), as Selfless
(anattato). So he turns his mind (citta) away from these and gathers
his mind/will within the realm of Immortality (amataya dhatuya). This
is tranquility; this is that which is most excellent!" [MN 1.436]. The
Buddha never considered the atman to be micchaditthi (wrong view). If
the Buddha disbelieved in an atman (soul) why did he not deny the
atman unambiguously? There is no such denial.
By denying outright the soul, by default, the Theravadins,
western 'scholars' examining Buddhism, and modern Buddhists imply that
the five aggregates are ultimate. This of course is absurd. They
have merely ****fted Buddhism to empiricism by ignoring pro-atman
statements. According to them, what is real is what makes sensory
knowledge possible, namely, the five aggregates which, ironically,
according to the canon, are =3D Mara, or evil (papa); [SN 3.195] "Mara =3D
five khandhas (empirical self)". It begs the question to assume that
the no-soul doctrine had been established at the beginning of the
Buddha's ministry and that the atman (soul) was, in every respect, an
abhorrent term. Still, for such a supposedly abhorrent term, there
are countless positive instances of atman used throughout the Nikayas,
especially used in compounds which are easily glossed over by a
prejudicial commentator and nominalist translators. In meeting these
instances, not surprisingly, these same prejudicial translators have
erected a theory that the atman is purely a reflexive pronoun. The
lexical rule that atman (Pali: attan) is to be used strictly in a
pronominal fa****on, or simply should be used as a signifier for the
finite body, is unwarranted. Scholars like Davids, Conze, Humphrey,
Schrader, Horner, Pande, Coomarswamy, Radhakrishnan, Sogen, Suzuki,
Julius Evola, and ****amura, just to name some im****tant scholars,
disagree with the claim that Buddha categorically denied an eternal
(nicca) soul, whose teachings then, would be classified as
Annihilationist and Materialist. In fact there are utterly none living
or dead who have examined the original texts in detail whilst
refraining from sectarian and commentarial explanations and concluded
Buddhism has in any way denied the atman thru and by means of the
usage of the term anatta or elsewise. The fatally determined
conglomeration which comprise the tem****al body "headed for the grave"
is not in dispute and is what is meant by anatta. To this there can be
no opposition since all forms of metaphysics cry out for a "freedom
from (that mere) self", as Buddhism is in full agreement: [Dhm. 147]
"Behold! That painted puppet this body, riddled with oozing sores, an
erected fa=E7ade. Diseased heap that fools fancy and swoon over; True
Essence is not part of it! For the body befalls utter destruction,
[Dhm. 148] "This body is soon worn out. It is that very same abode for
disease and sicknesses that is broken apart. The body is soon cast
away, that very putrid heap. It is always in death that life meets its
end!", [Dhm. 150] "Behold! This city of bones, plastered together with
flesh and blood. Within its walls are old age and death. Pride,
arrogance, and hypocrisy are its townsfolk!", [MN 1.185] "What of this
short-lived body which is clung to by means of craving? There is
nothing in it to say 'I' or 'mine' or 'me'."
The term anatman is found not only in Buddhist sutras, but also
in the Upanishads and lavishly so in the writings of Samkara as
mentioned earlier. Anatman is a common via negativa (neti neti, not
this, not that) teaching method common to Vedanta, Neoplatonism,
Buddhism, early Christian mystics, and others, wherein nothing
affirmative can be said of what is "beyond speculation, beyond words,
and concepts" thereby eliminating all positive characteristics that
might be thought to apply to the Soul, or be attributed to it; to wit
that the Subjective ontological Self-Nature (svabhava / atman) can
never be known objectively, but only thru "the denial of all things
which it (the Soul) is not"- Meister Eckhart. This doctrine is also
called by the Greeks Apophasis.
Modern Buddhism (so-called, not that it is Buddhism in any way)
labors under the heinous delusion that from the outset there is no
immaterial and ontological soul, or atman in the system of Buddhism
and therefore the only logical conclusion from this false premise is
that Buddhism is merely a profane moral Humanism based in
compassionate empirical idealism, 'liberation but no Liberant', and
this is palpably false. Under the guise of a more polished form of
physicalism or rather, Atheism, a mere qualifier of objective
phenomena, anatta, has overrun a noetic metaphysics, Buddhism, based
in extracting the nous (spirit, citta, Self) from the objective cosmos
(=3Danatta) wherein it has been miserably immersed since time immemorial
as due to the attribute of the Absolute (Brahman, Greek =3D Hen), that
being avijja (agnosis, nescience, as is philosophically meant
Emanationism). Avijja (a+vijja [atman]) and anatta (an+atman) in no
way differ, such that both refer to the beginningless privation, or
objectivity immanent to the Absolute. Overcoming this objective desire
(tanha) and enthrallment which constitute what is meant by anatta, is
vijja (illumination), or conventionally liberation (vimutta,
vijjavimutta); namely the only connection between atman and anatta is
that of avijja to which Buddhism's endgoal is pannavimutta (liberation
via wisdom) in which avijja has no longer any footing; where avijja is
not present, so too is anatta absent, this is the very Tathagata (gone
to Brahman, or That), the same 'dead man walking', he who has 'died
before he has (physically) died'.
That myself or anyone need go into such detail about a simple
term, anatta, which now corruptly forms the basis of modern Buddhism
only demonstrates the heights from which Buddhism has fallen severely
over the past 2400 years. Like an ancient city in the jungle overgrown
with vines and weeds, shat upon by nesting birds, and inhabited by
fanged monkeys who fling their feces at visitors, Buddhism attracts
only the mentally perverse who wrongly see superficially something
noble in a soulless nihilistic Humanistic idealism.
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