A little while the subject of Vietnam War was discussed. I was up late the
other nite and caught the end part of this recent doco with Robert
McNamara
the SoD in the 60's, and from what I saw it seemed very insightful in many
ways.
Here's one link to a review.
http://www.dvd.net.au/review.cgi?review_id=4218
One good aspect of the doco was about this ....
Robert S. McNamara's Ten Lessons have an optional intro from Mr. McNamara,
though this does little to enhance the reading experience. With the film's
subtitle being Eleven Lessons From The Life Of Robert S. McNamara, this is
the document from which the idea of the film was spawned.
SEE :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Fog_of_War#The_film.27s_eleven_lessons
The film's eleven lessons
1.. Empathize with your enemy.
2.. Rationality will not save us.
3.. There's something beyond one's self.
4.. Maximize efficiency.
5.. Pro****tionality should be a guideline in war.
6.. Get the data.
7.. Belief and seeing are both often wrong.
8.. Be prepared to reexamine your reasoning.
9.. In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil.
10.. Never say never.
11.. You can't change human nature.
11. Lessons from Vietnam
1.. We misjudged then — and we have since — the geopolitical intentions
of
our adversaries … and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of
their actions.
2.. We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our
own
experience … We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.
3.. We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to
fight and die for their beliefs and values.
4.. Our judgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound
ignorance
of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the
personalities and habits of their leaders.
5.. We failed then — and have since — to recognize the limitations of
modern, high-technology military equipment, forces and doctrine.
6.. We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task of
winning
the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.
7.. We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and
frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale military
involvement … before we initiated the action.
8.. After the action got under way and unanticipated events forced us
off
our planned course … we did not fully explain what was happening and why
we
were doing what we did.
9.. We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are
omniscient. Our judgment of what is in another people's or country's best
interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international
forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our
image or as we choose.
10.. We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action … should
be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces sup****ted
fully
(and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.
11.. We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other
aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate
solutions … At times, we may have to live with an imperfect, untidy world.
Underlying many of these errors lay our failure to organize the top
echelons
of the executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinarily
complex
range of political and military issues.


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